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The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959-
New Restrictions on "Top-Down" Organizing
In the course of investigating labor union corruption, the
McClellan Committee' uncovered numerous instances of what is
commonly called "top-down" organizing -where a union at-
tempts to force the employer to recognize it as bargaining agent
for his employees without first securing the employees' support.2
Disturbed by these findings and by recent court decisions s hold-
ing that, in most instances, "top-down" organizing was permis-
sible under the Taft-Hartley Act,4 Representatives Landrum and
Griffin introduced legislation in the 86th Congress which, in
part, would have amended the Taft-Hartley Act so as to impose
severe restrictions on such union activity." The House and Sen-
ate failed to agree on these and other provisions of the Landrum-
Griffin bill, so a Conference Committee was appointed to settle
the differences.6 The compromises on regulation of "top-down"
organizing reached by this committee and eventually incorpor-
ated into the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 19597 are the subjects of this Comment.
Restrictions on "Top-Down" Organizing Prior to LMRDA
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act8 guarantees to
1. The McClellan Committee is properly termed the "Senate Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field."
2. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was found to be especially
vigorous in organizing from the "top-down." See, Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field,
85th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 16 at pp. 279-81; pt. 38 at pp. 14414-14467; pt. 45
at pp. 16379-16381; pt. 56, at pp. 19589, 19596 (1958).
3. International Assn. of Machinists, Lodge 942 v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 796 (9th
Cir. 1959) (the Alloy case) ; Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639 v. NLRB,
274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (the Curtis decision) (affirmed by the Supreme
Court subsequent to the passage of the LMRDA, 80 Sup. Ct. 706 (1960));
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America v. NLRB, 269
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1959) (the O'Sullivan Rubber case also affirmed subsequent
to the passage of the LMRDA by the United States Supreme Court, 80 Sup. Ct.
759 (1960). These decisions are discussed page 246 infra.
4. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1952).
5. H.R. 8400, 105 CONG. REC. 13125 (Daily ed., July 27, 1959). Previously
Senator McClellan had introduced such remedial legislation in the Senate without
success. 105 CONG. REC. 6657 (April 24, 1959).
6. 105 CONG. REC. 15892 (August 14, 1959) ; 105 CONG. REC. 15965 (August
17, 1959).
7. 73 STAT. 519, 542-544, § 704 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4), (7) (Supp.
1959).
8. Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 451 (1952).
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certain employees the right to "form, join and assist labor organ-
izations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing . . . [or] . . . to refrain from any or all such
activities." Section 8 imposes correlative duties on the employer
by requiring him to refrain from certain forms of interference
with the exercise of these employee rights,9 and as amended by
the Taft-Hartley Act, imposes similar duties upon labor organi-
zations.10 Prior to the passage of the LMRDA, "top-down" or-
ganizing was an unfair labor practice only where the union insti-
gated concerted work stoppages in order to obtain its objectives.1 1
In recent decisions the NLRB has tried in vain to forge broad
restrictions on "top-down" activities from Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act which provides that: "[I] t shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent...
to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7."12 In the Curtis case,'3 where a minority
union picketed an employer for the avowed purpose of forcing
him to recognize it as bargaining agent the Board said:
"In terms of statutory language,... our question is whether
this picketing restrains or coerces the employees in their free
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. These latter
'rights' expressly include the right of all employees 'to bar-
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1952) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer -
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
"(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . .
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization [except union shop]."
10. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 144, 145, §8(b) (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1952).
11. 61 STAT. 144, 145, §8(b) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1952): "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer in a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials
or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is . . . (B)
forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organiza-
tion has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provi-
sions of section 9; (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular labor organization if another labor organization has been cer-
tified as the representative of such employees under the provisons of section
9 . . . . "
12. 61 STAT. 144, 145, §8(b)(1)(A) (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A)
(1952).
13. Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639, Intl. Brhd. of Teamsters and
Curtis Brothers, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
COMMENTS
gain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing.' If minority union picketing has a restraining or co-
ercive effect upon the employees, and if such coercion cuts
into their privilege to choose or reject any particular union,
the only two essential elements of the unfair labor practice
spelled in Section 8 (b) (1) (A) have been established.1 14
The court of appeals refused to sustain this application of Sec-
tion 8(b) (1) (A) on the ground that it was intended to apply
only to union activities "bordering on violence."'15 In the Alloy
case,1 where a minority union sought recognition by circulating
a "we do not patronize" list, the Board attempted to apply Sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) (A) in a similar manner. The court of appeals re-
versed this application on the ground that suppression of the list
would violate first amendment guarantees of free speech. 7 It
was in an effort to implement the Board's reasoning in these two
instances and to "overrule" the appellate reversals that Congress
passed the LMRDA restrictions on "top-down" organizing.18
THE LMRDA AMENDMENTS
Recognition Picketing - Section 8 (b) (7)
The LMRDA adds a new section, 8 (b) (7), to the Taft-Hart-
ley Act,19 unmistakably imposing restrictions on "top-down" or-
ganizing through pressures in the form of picketing exerted at or
near the primary employer's place of business. According to this
section it is now an unfair labor practice for a union to picket or
threaten to picket in an attempt to force or require the employer
to recognize the union as bargaining agent for his employees
where (A) the employer has already lawfully recognized another
union or (B) where a valid Board election has been conducted
within the past twelve months or (C) where the union has not
14. Id. at 234.
15. NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639, 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir.
1959). This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court subsequent to the
passage of the LMRDA, 80 Sup. Ct. 706 (1960). See Petro, Labor Relations Law,
35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733, 745-751 (1960) for critical appraisal of these appellate
decisions.
16. Alloy Mfg. Co. & International Assn. of Machinists, Lodge 942, AFL-CIO,
119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957).
17. NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 942, 263 F.2d 796, 799
(9th Cir. 1959) : "We consider the conduct of union ['we do not patronize'] listing
and persuasion, except picketing, to be within the general area of protection of
the first amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech."
18. See the Conference Committee Report, H.R. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 704(a), p. 41 (1959).
19. 73 STAT. 519, 544, § 704(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. 1959).
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filed a petition for a 9 (c) election20 within a reasonable period
of time after the commencement of picketing, a "reasonable
time" not to exceed thirty days. These provisions broaden the
Board's Curtis doctrine since they are equally applicable to ma-
jority as well as minority picketing.
To Section 8 (b) (7) (C), the Conference Committee added a
compromisory proviso which was adopted:
"Provided... that nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be
construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including con-
sumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or
have a contract with, a labor organization, unless the effect
of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up,
deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any serv-
ices.,,21
The meaning of this proviso is not too clear since it is not readily
apparent wherein picketing for the purpose of "truthfully advis-
ing the public that an employer does not employ members of, or
have a contract with a labor organization" is prohibited in the
preceding portions of Section 8 (b) (7) .22 The thrust of the sec-
tion is to regulate picketing aimed at recognition and nowhere
outside of the proviso are found any restraints on "purely infor-
mational picketing." Since the proviso does not relate to the rest
of the section, one might tend to discount it as redundant. How-
ever, the Board and the courts have not discounted the proviso.
20. Labor Management Relations Act, § 9(c), 61 STAT. 144, 146 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1952). This section sets forth the normal certification ma-
chinery to be used at the instance of either employer or employees. A proviso to
Section 8(b) (7) (C) provides for an expedited election circumventing the time-
consuming procedures of Section 9(c).
However, it has been held that the union cannot obtain a "quickie" election
on its own motion but must be accused by the employer of violating Section
8(b) (7) (C) before the Board will direct such an election. Nor may a union
allege as a defense to a charge of violating 8(b) (7) (C) that the employer has
refused to bargain collectively in violation of Section 8(a) (5). The fact that
an employer had refused to bargain does not relieve the union of its responsibility
to use the ordinary certification procedures outlined in Section 9(c). Greene v.
International Typographical Union, Local 285, 182 F. Supp. 788 (D. Conn.
1960). See also Report of Adivsory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law,
United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 45 L.L.R. 335
(1960).
21. 73 STAT. 519, 544, § 704(c) (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. 1959).
See, H.R. No. 1147 on S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 704(c), p. 41 (1959).
22. Professor Aaron has described this portion of the LMRDA as "drafted in
such execrable form as to invite oracular interpretation rather than precise
analysis." Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HAjv. L. REv. 1086, 1100 (1959).
[Vol. XXI
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The proviso was recently interpreted for the first time at
the appellate level in McLeod v. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and
Asst's, Local 8 9 .2- The case involved an alleged attempt by the
union to gain recognition from the Stork Club in Manhattan.
The union established a 24-hour picket line with placards advis-
ing the public that the Stork Club did not have a union contract,
that the club had discriminated against employees for union
membership and that union working conditions did not prevail.
Subsequent to a declaration by the union that it had no recog-
nitional objectives but was conducting the picket line solely for
informational purposes in order to divert Stork Club patrons to
union establishments, 24 three truck drivers refused to make de-
liveries because of the presence of the picket line. The Board
sought a temporary injunction in federal district court alleging
reasonable belief that the union had violated 8 (b) (7) (C).25 The
pivotal issue in the district court was whether or not the union
was seeking to force the Stork Club to recognize it as bargaining
agent for its employees. The trial court found recognitional ob-
jectives and thus held the informational picketing proviso inap-
plicable.
"It is difficult, if not impossible to imagine any kind of in-
formational picketing pertaining to an employer's failure or
refusal to employ union members or to have a collective bar-
gaining agreement where another object of such picketing
would not be ultimate union recognition or bargaining. In
most instances certainly the aim of such informational pick-
eting could only be to bring economic pressure upon the em-
ployer to recognize and bargain with the labor organization."
(Emphasis added.) 26
It would seem that the trial court indulged in the presumption
that a union would not advertise the lack of a collective bargain-
ing agreement unless it desired one. Upon appeal, however, the
court of appeals did not apply the presumption:
23. 46 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1960).
24. The union advised both management and the NLRB of this change in policy.
25. MeLeod v. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Ass'ts, Local 89, 181 F. Supp.
742 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
26. 181 F. Supp. 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court went on to point out the
dilemma in which management would have found itself were it not for 8(b)
(7) (C). The employer could not legally recognize the union since it did not
represent a majority of his employees. Had not 8(b) (7) (C) been available to
him, the pickets could have remained indefinitely. "It was to meet precisely this
situation that the amendments were adopted to the Labor Management Relations
Act." Id. at 748.
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"To say that the carrying of signs stating that the employer
has no contract with the union is proof of recognitional pick-
eting is to ignore the letter and, we think, the spirit of the
statute. This is so because even if there had been a complete
absence of any refusals to deliver induced by the picketing,
the same reasoning as used by the court below could be ap-
plied to render the picketing unlawful. We think . . . that
the statute requires a determination whether the picketing has
as an objective, one of forcing or requiring the employer to
bargain with or recognize the union. In considering this ques-
tion, the fact that the union carried signs expressly allowed
by the statute should not be a basis for concluding that the
union had a recognitional objective. If however, the allow-
able picketing had the effect of inducing other employees not
to make deliveries, then, the picketing is to be declared unlaw-
ful but only to the extent that this mode of disseminating
information is proven to have an unlawful effect." (Empha-
sis added.) 2 7
Contrasting these two interpretations of the proviso, it seems
that the major point of variance is the question of whether recog-
nitional motives may be presumed from the fact of informational
picketing, or whether such objectives must be proved. The trial
court apparently employed this presumption because it expected
to discover a recognitional purpose in almost every case. The
court of appeals did not employ the presumption apparently be-
cause the statute expressly protects nonrecognitional, purely in-
formational picketing.28
To summarize the appellate court's application of Section
8(b) (7), it may be said that if a recognitional objective be
proved, the picketing is subject to regulation under paragraphs
(A), (B) or (C) of Section 8 (b) (7) without reference to the in-
formational picketing proviso. If a recognitional purpose is not
proved, the picketing is protected by the informational picketing
27. McLeod v. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Asst's, Local 89, 46 L.R.R.M.
2577, 2580 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. Some non-organizational motives do, however, suggest themselves. If a non-
union employer is able to cut corners on wages and working conditions so as to
undersell unionized businesses, the union might have a substantial interest in
securing union standards in that competing plant rather than risk having to
accept lower wages and sub-standard working conditions in order to allow union
employers to meet non-union competition. It might be more advantageous to the
union merely to apply economic pressure on the non-union employer in order to




proviso unless it has an effect of causing secondary refusals to
deliver, pick up, or perform services. However, regardless of
where the burden of proving or disproving recognitional objec-
tives is eventually placed, it appears that courts will find it dif-
ficult to infer any motive behind such "informational picketing"
other than an intent ultimately to gain recognition as bargaining
representative.
There is some confusion as to whether publicity, other than
picketing, is to come within the ambit of the informational pick-
eting proviso. The proviso first appears to regulate picketing or
other publicity, but drops the phrase "or other publicity" the sec-
ond time picketing is mentioned. Although a careful reading of
Section 8 (b) (7) suggests that picketing is the only activity regu-
lated therein, Representative Griffin was of the opinion that this
section was meant to reach "other publicity" as well.29 His inter-
pretation is supported by some rather ambiguous language in the
Conference Committee report to the effect that the Alloy case
was "overruled" insofar as it is inconsistent with Section 8
-(b) (7).30 If the informational picketing proviso reaches pub-
licity also, one would assume that such publicity is protected only
so long as it does not cause refusals to pick up, deliver, or per-
form services by employees of persons other than the primary
employer. Though, as has been indicated, the applicability of the
informational picketing proviso to publicity other than picketing
is questionable in the primary situation, there is little doubt that
another LMRDA amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act was intend-
ed to restrict such publicity when used against a secondary em-
ployer..
"Top-Down" Pressures Via Secondary Employers
It is not uncommon for a union to seek the cooperation of
distributors and retailers in refusing to handle the products of a
primary employer until he recognizes the union. If the secondary
employer refuses, the union may establish a picket line at his
29. "The second proviso to the subsection [8(b) (7) (C)] makes an exception
of picketing or other publicity directed to consumers which is for limited purposes
and which does not have the effect of inducing employees of others to refuse to
cross the picket line to make pickups and deliveries and to perform services. Any
type of publicity, including picketing, which has this effect is not protected by the
proviso." Hon. Robert P, Griffin (Mich.) in speech regarding report of Conference
Committee, 105 CONG. REC. 18153 (Sept. 4, 1959).
30. Presumably the court of appeals decision which disallowed application of the
Curtis doctrine to the circulation of a "we do not patronize" list. See note 18
anpra and accompanying textual discussion.
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place of business. As a result, his employees may refuse to come
to work and his customers may refuse to buy. When the picket
line's effectiveness becomes intolerable, the secondary employer
may agree to cease doing business with the primary employer
until the latter recognizes the union.
Under the original provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, this
type of secondary pressure was prohibited only if the union
sought to gain the cooperation of the secondary employer by in-
ducing a concerted work stoppage.3 1 As rewritten in the
LMRDA,'3 2 Section 8 (b) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice to
induce even individual work stoppages. 33 Furthermore, a union
may not "threaten, restrain or coerce" any person in commerce
in order to realize any of the proscribed objectives enumerated
in Section 8(b) (4), which includes, ". . . (B) forcing or requir-
ing any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer ... or to
cease doing business with any other person. 3 4 Presumably, the
union cannot bring pressure on the suppliers, agents, independ-
ent contractors, or customers of the secondary employer in order
to force him to cease doing business either with his customers or
with the primary employer who is involved in the dispute.3 5 If
applied with the breadth this statutory language indicates, Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) as amended spells the end of virtually every lawful
form of secondary pressure.
To Subsection 8 (b) (4) (B), the Conference Committee added
a proviso, "Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B)
shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlaw-
ful, any primary strike or primary picketing." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 3 6
31. Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(b) (4), 61 STAT. 144, 145 (1947).
See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
32. 73 STAT. 519, 542-543, § 704(a) (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (Supp.
1959).
33. Ibid.: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a union . . . (4) (i) to
engaged in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by any person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike
or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, trans-
port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, material or commodities
or perform any services ... "
34. 73 STAT. 519, 542-543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (B) (1959).
35. See Senator Goldwater's comments on this point in 105 CoNG. REC. A8523
(Daily ed. October 2, 1959).
36. 73 STAT. 519, 543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1959). Explaining this
proviso, the Conference Committee report said: "[T]he purpose of this provision
is to make it clear that the changes in Section 8(b) (4) do not overrule or
qualify.the present rules of law permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor
dispute. This provision does not eliminate, restrict or modify the limitations on
[Vol. XXI
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"This proviso was added in response to fears expressed by
some union attorneys that the enlargement of Section 8(b)
(4) (i) to include union inducement of individual employees,
such for example, as inducement of an individual truck driver
not to cross a picket line might have the effect of prohibiting
even primary picketing. '8 7
Then to the entire Section 8 (b) (4) was added:
"Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph
(4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity other than picketing, for the pur-
pose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers
and members of a labor organization, that a product or prod-
ucts are produced by an employer with whom the labor or-
ganization has a primary dispute and are distributed by an-
other employer, as long as such publicity does not have an
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person
other than the primary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or
not to perform any services at the establishment of the em-
ployer engaged in such distribution." (Emphasis added.)38
As the AFL-CIO interpreted this proviso:
"It apparently is the intent of Congress, that if a union is
engaged in a primary labor dispute with employer A who
makes widgets, which are sold at an establishment not owned
by A, the union may handbill the establishment, or otherwise
publicize the facts, but may not picket. Even the handbilling
or other truthful publicity ceases to be permissible, however,
if it has an effect of inducing any employee, other than the
employee of A, to refuse to make deliveries or perform serv-
ices at the establishment where the product is sold." 39
In summary, where a union seeks to gain recognition from a
primary employer, it may not follow his products to a secondary
distributor or retailer and there picket with the objective of fore-
picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute that are in existing law." H.R.
No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 704a, p. 38 (1959).
37. AFL-CIO, Analysis of the Labor Management Reporting and Diaclosure
Act of 1959, p. 35.
38. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 704 (a), 73 STAT.
519, 543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1959). See H.R. No. 1147, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 704a, p. 38 (1959).
39. AFL-CIO, Analysis of the "Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959," p. 35.
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ing the retailer to cease selling the product to his customers or to
cease ordering the product from the primary employer. How-
ever, the union may publicize the fact of its dispute with hand-
bills, "we do not patronize" lists, newspaper advertisements, and
the like, but such publicizing becomes an unfair labor practice
and may be enjoined if as a result any person employed by any-
one, save the primary employer, refuses to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods, or refuses to perform services at the estab-
lishment of the distributor or retailer.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Most of the famous free speech cases4" of the twenties dealt
with protections of political and religious speech under the first
amendment. From these decisions emerged the classic "clear and
present danger" test first propounded by Justice Holmes in
Schenck 'v. United States.41 According to that test, individual
speech may not be abridged unless there is a showing that the
speech causes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits
of ideas by competition for acceptance in the marketplace of pub-
lic opinion. 42 Then in 1941, in Thornhill v. Alabama,48 the United
States Supreme Court came forth with a definitive pronounce-
ment of first amendment protection of free speech in the context
of a labor dispute:
"The freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the Consti-
tution embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern .... Freedom of dis-
cussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.
"In the circumstances of our times, the dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be
regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guar-
anteed by the Constitution. '"
40. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
41. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
42. Id. at 52.
43. 310 U.S. 88 (1941).
44. Id. at 101, 102. While engaged in picketing, defendant Thornhill had dis-
suaded another from going to work. He was accused of. violating an Alabama




In subsequent decisions, the Thornhill doctrine has been nar-
rowed as regards picketing. The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that picketing often persuades because of non-speech or
"signal characteristics" due to the physical presence of the
picket line, irrespective of what message appears on the pla-
cards.45 For this reason, picketing has come to be regarded as
"more than free speech,"4 6 and thus not as fully protected by
the first amendment as other modes of expression. In a re-
cent pronouncement the Supreme Court summarized these post-
Thornhil picketing decisions:
"This series of cases established a broad field in which a
state, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal
or civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its
courts could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed
at preventing effectuation of that policy. '47
It is clear from Section 8 (b) (7) that according to Congress,
"top-down" organizing is contrary to public policy. More speci-
fically, it is contrary to public policy for a union to picket a
primary employer in an attempt to force him to recognize the
union as sole bargaining agent without prior approval from his
employees. Though not quite so evident from the statute, it may
be said, nevertheless, that according to the second proviso to
Section 8(b) (7) (C), purely informational picketing without
recognitional objectives becomes contrary to public policy and
is therefore enjoinable whenever it causes employees of other
employers to refuse to deliver, pick up, or perform services.
Therefore, it is submitted that insofar as these new restrictions
apply to picketing, they should be upheld as constitutional. But
an employer's place of business. In holding the statute unconstitutional on its
face, the United States Supreme Court said: "Every expression of opinion on
matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the inter-
ests of one rather than another group in society. But the group in power at any
moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of
matters of public interest merely on a showing that others may be persuaded to
take action inconsistent with its interests." Id. at 104.
45. Mr. Justice Douglas in Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942) : "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech because it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line
may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated."
46. Ibid.




the constitutionality of the restrictions on publicity, other than
picketing, is another matter.
Publicity Other Than Picketing
Apparently, the Thornhill decision has not been subsequently
modified as regards publicity other than picketing.48 Accord-
ingly, it would seem that suppression of publicity, other than
picketing, would be justified only when such publicity constitutes
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil.
Assume that a union, attempting to organize from the "top-
down," follows the primary employer's product to independent
retail outlets and there distributes handbills asking the public
not to patronize the retailer so long as he handles that product.
Assume further that the union circulates a "we do not patronize"
list among its membership and among consumers sympathetic
to labor, requesting that they do not purchase the products of
the primary employer and that they refuse to patronize retailers
who continue to sell that product. Under the terms of Section
8 (b) (4), either of these modes of publicizing the dispute would
become an unfair labor practice and could be enjoined if as a
result any individual not employed by the primary employer
should, in the course of his employment, refuse to pick up, de-
liver or transport any goods, or refuse to perform services at
the establishment of an employer engaged in the distribution
of the primary employer's product. Should the constitutionality
of such suppression of publicity other than picketing be chal-
lenged, it seems that on the basis of the Thornhill decision, ap-
plication of the clear and present danger test would be appro-
priate. The Supreme Court has traditionally reserved to itself
final determinations as to whether certain speech constitutes
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. However, there
is language in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds4'9 tend-
ing to indicate that, in the context of interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court will be most reluctant to overrule the judgment
of Congress in this respect.
"It should be emphasized that Congress, not the courts, is
48. Apparently it is still the law that "abridgement of such discussion can be
justified only where the clear and present danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition
for acceptance in the marketplace of public opinion." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 104 (1941).
49. 389 U.S. 382 (1950).
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primarily charged with determination of the need for regula-
tion of activities affecting interstate commerce. This Court
must, if such regulation unduly infringes personal freedoms,
declare the statute invalid under the First Amendment's com-
mand that the opportunities for free public discussion be
maintained. But insofar as the problem is one of drawing
inferences concerning the need for regulation of particular
forms of conduct from conflicting evidence, this Court is in
no position to substitute its judgment as to the necessity or
desirability of the statute for that of Congress." (Em-
phasis added.) 50
In attempting to defend the constitutionality of the proviso, the
government might be expected to argue that since Congress,
in exercising its acknowledged expertise in such matters, has
determined the necessity of curbing publicity other than picket-
ing which results in secondary work stoppages, the Supreme
Court is in no position to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress as to the necessity of the publicity proviso. Followed
to its logical, if dubious, conclusion, this line of reasoning would
hold that whenever Congress imposes restrictions on freedom
of speech, in the area of interstate commerce, it has impliedly
determined the existence of a clear and present danger, which
determination may not be disputed by the Supreme Court.
. In opposition, the union might contend that nowhere in the
legislative history of this proviso was the danger of such pub-
licity even discussed. The proviso was passed as an accommoda-
tion to the secondary employer, to save him the inconvenience
and loss of business accompanying refusals to deliver, pick up,
or perform services. According to Thornhill, such "inconveni-
ence" is insufficient to justify intrusions upon free publicity of
labor disputes by means other than picketing.' Cessation of
deliveries may be inconsistent with the interests of a secondary
employer but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that free-
dom of speech cannot be abridged merely because the effects of
the speech are inconvenient - the effects must be dangerous,
and clearly so.
For the reasons set forth in this latter argument, it is sub-
50. Id. at 400.
51. Id. at 104: "[T]he group in power at any moment may not impose penal
sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely




mitted that the union should prevail, and that the publicity pro-
viso to Section 8(b) (4) should be declared unconstitutional. 52
CONCLUSIONS
Though reportedly the informational picketing, proviso and
publicity provisos were added as concessions to pro-labor fac-
tions,53 their application may prove most convenient to manage-
ment. For example, if a trucker refuses to deliver through a
purely informational picket line, the picketing may be enjoined
without a showing that employee rights have been violated, as
would have been required by the NLRB's Curtis doctrine. A
similar easy remedy is supposedly available to stop secondary
publicity resulting in secondary work stoppages. Moreover, these
provisos seem open to widespread abuse by management, as
noticed by Congressman Roosevelt:
"[O]ne does not have to be a lawyer or legal draftsman to
see how empty and meaningless this so-called compromise
language is. Surely one can readily see how a primary em-
ployer could break such informational picketing. All he would
have to do is to get a fellow employer, not kindly disposed to
trade unions, to instruction [sic] his secretary - say - to
refuse to deliver a message to the primary employer on the
pretext that her service would violate her conviction aroused
by the picket line. And there you have it. The picket line
would be declared unlawful .... We are faced with the same
language gimmick - regarding the secondary boycott provi-
sions., 54
However, Section 8 (b) (7) does implement the basic concept
of the NLRB's Curtis doctrine - that recognitional picketing by
an uncertified union tends to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights of free choice guaranteed by Section 7.
On the other hand, Congress has probably failed in its efforts
to curb "top-down" pressures exerted through publicity other
than picketing because of first amendment guarantees of free
speech.
As the rather complex provisions of Section 8(b) (7) are
disentangled by the courts, perhaps the restrictions on primary
52. The same reasoning would apply to the informational picketing proviso to
Section 8(b) (7) (C) if the latter is construed to apply to publicity other than
picketing. See discussion of this possibility at page 255 8upra.
53. See Senator Kennedy's remarks in. 105 CoNG. REc. 17898: (Sept. 3, 1959)..
54. 105 CONG. REC. 18142 (Sept. 4, 1959).
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picketing will become useful in prohibiting most forms of "top-
down" organizing. It is submitted, however, that perhaps the
same result could have been realized by amending Section
8(b) (1) (A) specifically to include peaceful picketing, thereby
implementing the NLRB's Curtis doctrine without resorting to
the intricacies of Section 8(b) (7).
Gerald Le Van
